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When does the state listen?
Communication between the state and 
citizens is an essential element for an equal 
and just society. Growing social inequalities, 
lack of proper public services, and denial of 
basic human rights all act to widen existing 
communication gaps. Key to bridging these 
gaps is ensuring not only that citizen voices are 
heard, but also that states have the capacity 
and incentive to listen and respond. As much 
of the literature on accountability focuses on 
citizen voices, a group of researchers from 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania 
– in collaboration with the Institute of 
Development Studies – decided to look at 
state responsiveness. Trying to find instances 
of accountable governance, when the state 
is responsive to citizen voice, this team of 
researchers interviewed key actors across the 
state–citizen spectrum who had been involved 
in landmark social justice policy processes 
during major junctures of democratisation in 
these four countries. Calling their research 
project When Does the State Listen? (Loureiro 
et al. 2016), they examined when and how the 
state listened, and to which actors; and why, at 
times, it chose not to listen. 
The researchers identified three types of 
juncture when the state listened: (1) ‘hearing’ 
moments, when the state engaged with 
citizen voices but did not change the way 
it acted; (2) ‘consultation’ moments, when 
it engaged with citizen voices through two-
way dialogue, resulting in one-sided action; 
and (3) ‘concertation’ moments, when 
coalitions between reform-minded officials 
and politicians and organised citizen voices 
engaged in two-way dialogue and action for 
accountable governance. They witnessed 
concertation moments when state and 
non-state actors shared a sense of urgency 
and a common goal, despite different 
understandings of accountable governance. 
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Midwives and nurses at a hospital in Accra, Ghana.
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But they also found that states often reverted 
to consulting or hearing, as concertation 
moments are arduous and temporary, and 
part of larger, ever-changing policy processes.
In this brief, Terence Darko looks at the 
development of Ghana’s National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and examines 
the extent to which urgency contributed to 
an increase in political accountability. He 
notices that during democratic consolidation 
in Ghana, when the government had an 
urgent goal without a clearly defined plan, 
it was more open to engagement with non-
state actors to consult and even concert. As 
the policy progressed and the government 
changed, the state felt less of a need to 
concert but still consulted with non-state 
actors, as the country’s free, dynamic and 
relatively autonomous political society kept 
on pushing for its voice to be heard.
Introduction
The creation of Ghana’s NHIS was a major 
health policy reform. Its implementation 
was influenced by both internal and external 
factors. Internally, the government’s need 
for a national health insurance policy was 
influenced by democratic developments, 
which were evident in the successful 
transition of governments following a 
peaceful presidential and parliamentary 
election in 2000 (Morrison 2004; Cheeseman 
2010), and a massive media campaign 
against the ill effects of existing structures 
of healthcare for the masses. Externally, the 
ratification of the Millennium Development 
Goals, coupled with the adoption of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper to access debt 
relief during the pre-policy and design phase, 
also influenced the government’s decision to 
enact a national health insurance policy. 
By the early 2000s, it was becoming obvious 
that democratic development, coupled with 
pressure from Ghana’s donors, was bringing 
about a political transformation in the 
relationship between the state and citizens. 
These developments provided a basis for 
an improvement in the process of political 
accountability, and were clearly played out 
in the policy design phase that led to the 
adoption of the NHIS in Ghana. 
In the application of accountability 
mechanisms in the health sector, 
Brinkerhoff (2004) highlights three types of 
accountability: financial, performance and 
political. This briefing focuses on political 
accountability and establishes its connection 
with the policy processes of Ghana’s health 
insurance scheme. Political accountability 
refers to the responsibility or obligation of 
government officials to act in the best interest 
of the people or face the consequences. 
The political process and elections are the 
main avenues for this type of accountability, 
but it also plays out in the policy process 
(Brinkerhoff 2004). Regarding the making of 
a health policy, political accountability also 
relates to the government’s stewardship over 
the entire healthcare system. This can be 
understood as a function of a government 
that is responsible for the welfare of its 
citizens, and also concerned about the trust 
and legitimacy of governance as perceived by 
the citizenry (Saltman and Ferroussier-Davies 
2000). 
One vital feature of the government’s 
stewardship discussed in this briefing is how 
a multitude of state and non-state actors had 
a voice in the design, implementation and 
revision processes of the NHIS. The case of 
the NHIS is used to track state responsiveness 
to citizen demands for access to public 
 RESEARCH 
BRIEFING
5
16
How does government responsiveness come about? 
The politics of accountability in Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme
services. The research sought to establish 
the extent to which citizens cooperated with 
the government throughout the design, 
implementation and revision stages of 
the scheme, and how this cooperation 
offered citizens an opportunity to hold the 
government accountable. This briefing shows 
that the health insurance policy process, to a 
great extent, offered political accountability 
to citizens because state and non-state 
actors within the health sector shared the 
same urgency and a common goal, even if 
they did not agree on the course of action 
to reach that goal. This case shows not only 
that the government responded directly 
to citizens’ health concerns in order to 
stay in power democratically, but also that 
beyond elections, the government listened 
to the demands of non-state actors for the 
accountability of the scheme.
Ghana’s political context 
and the structure of the 
health system
Since 1992 Ghana has been under 
constitutional rule, with democratic 
governance that sanctions checks and 
balances through the three arms of 
government. Under the 1992 constitution, 
an institutional framework for popular 
participation and programmes for a more 
direct interface between government 
and people were created in the areas of 
economic planning and local government-
level development and democracy, with 
District Assemblies providing administrative 
leadership. The District Assemblies have 
become a key political mechanism for 
ensuring popular participation in decision-
making at the local level (Government of 
Ghana 1992; Government of Ghana 1994; 
Government of Ghana 2003). 
Beyond participation, the Ghanaian 
constitution also contains provisions for 
transparency and accountability mechanisms. 
For instance, in ensuring financial discipline 
and effective management of resources and 
economic governance to meet the needs 
of citizenry, it provides for institutions that 
exercise stringent control on the use of public 
resources. The political ambience further 
promotes civil liberties, and government 
cooperation with civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in national policy design and 
implementation via sector working groups. 
The country runs a presidential government 
with an executive president elected for 
a term between four and eight years, 
complemented by the legislature, judiciary, 
and a vibrant media and civil society (Arthur 
2010). Although the constitution permits a 
multiparty political system, elections over the 
years have been dominated by two political 
parties: the National Democratic Congress 
The health insurance policy process, to a great extent, 
offered political accountability to citizens because state and 
non-state actors within the health sector shared the same 
urgency and a common goal, even if they did not agree on 
the course of action to reach that goal. 
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(NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
(Gyimah-Boadi 2008). These two parties 
currently control the 275 parliamentary seats 
of the legislature. 
Ghana has a multi-level and integrated health 
system distributed throughout the country. It 
comprises community-based health planning 
and services zones; health centres; district, 
regional and teaching hospitals; private 
health providers (mainly the Christian Health 
Association of Ghana, CHAG), and health-
related non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The Ministry of Health (MoH) 
oversees this decentralised health system and 
other governmental and regulatory entities. 
There is also a vibrant private sector offering 
both hospital and non-hospital care in several 
districts, especially in urban areas; this sector 
provides more than half the services in every 
category of the health sector (Sealy, Makinen 
and Bitran 2010).
Pre-design phase of the 
National Health Insurance 
Scheme (1990–2000)
Health insurance as a policy option became 
necessary when the ill effects of paying 
for health services at the point of delivery 
(also known as ‘cash and carry’) reached a 
tipping point in Ghana. There were specific 
instances of the mothers of new-born babies 
and patients in government hospitals being 
detained for not having the money to pay 
medical bills (Nyonator and Kutzin 1999; 
Atuguba 2013). Between 1995 and 2000, 
these situations on the health front rendered 
the ruling NDC government unpopular 
(Adedeji 2001). Although in 1999 the 
government, in partnership with the Ghana 
Health Care Company, had attempted to 
pilot a tax-funded health insurance scheme, 
not a single person was registered. At the 
same time, however, several community-
based mutual health insurance schemes 
– implemented by different actors including 
the St Theresa’s Catholic Mission Hospital 
at Nkoranza, the bilateral donors Danida 
(the Danish International Development 
Agency) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and 
faith-based organisations and other NGOs – 
were working successfully. 
Against this background, some bureaucrats 
from the MoH and civil society actors had 
been involved in feasibility studies and health 
insurance pilots in some districts (interview 
with Irene Agyepong, member of the 
Ministerial Task Force on Health Insurance 
(2001–02), 7 July 2015). Following several 
public debates, and amplified by the media, 
a national health insurance scheme became 
a key issue during the 2000 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. According to Irene 
Agyapong, the efforts of all these actors 
during the 1990s served as a catalyst for the 
development of the NHIS, as well as providing 
useful lessons for what was to become the 
legal structure of health insurance.
The design phase (2001–03)
When the NPP government came to power 
in 2001, they had no clear road map on the 
structure and funding of the health insurance 
policy in their election manifesto. By March 
2001, they had commissioned a Ministerial 
Task Force to support and advise the MoH 
on the development of a national health 
insurance scheme, the establishment of 
systems and capacity for health insurance 
regulation, the development of health 
insurance legislation, and the mobilisation 
of extra resources to support national health 
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insurance (Agyepong and Adjei 2008). Task 
Force members were selected on the grounds 
of having technical knowledge on health 
insurance, or because they were perceived 
to be important stakeholders. Most of the 
members were bureaucrats from the MoH 
and the Ghana Health Service (GHS). The 
remainder were representatives from the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the now-
defunct Ghana Health Care Company. After 
debating whether the scheme should take 
a centralised single-payer approach or a 
decentralised community-based approach, 
the Task Force eventually settled on a hybrid 
arrangement that became a draft policy which 
was put out for broad public consultation.
In June 2001, as the draft policy proceeded 
to stakeholder consultations at both national 
and local government levels, the Chair of the 
Task Force – Samuel Akor, the Director for 
Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
in the MoH – was replaced. A new Minister 
of Health was also appointed just after the 
Task Force drafted the policy (Agyepong 
and Adjei 2008). The new chair continued 
to coordinate design activities for the NHIS 
prior to its passage through Parliament, and 
with the new minister brought new members 
onto the Task Force, including other 
bureaucrats from the MoH and the GHS, 
and consultants. Some of the original Task 
Force members resigned, sensing a deviation 
from the proposed hybrid arrangement, and 
political differences with Akor. 
After reviewing the concerns and proposals 
raised in various stakeholder consultation 
forums, the Task Force updated the zero 
draft. The revised policy that was debated in 
Parliament included the possibility of using 
a proportion of value-added tax (VAT) as a 
funding option for the scheme, inspired by 
the Minister of Finance, who had already 
increased VAT to raise revenue for education 
without any public opposition. However, this 
proposal proved contentious, as did other 
aspects of the basic structures of the scheme. 
Nonetheless, by the last quarter of 2003, the 
NHIS Act (Act 650) was passed into law.
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Implementation phase I: 
the NPP era (2004–08) 
NHIS implementation began in 2004 before 
the presidential and parliamentary elections 
of that year. The ruling NPP government won 
the election and vigorously continued the 
implementation of the scheme. Between 2004 
and 2008, the NHIS became well accepted 
among the population. According to a citizens 
assessment survey on the NHIS, conducted in 
2008 by the National Development Planning 
Commission, the number of people registered 
for the scheme increased from 1,797,140 
in 2005 to 12,518,560 at the end of 2008, 
representing about 61.3% of the country’s 
population. The report indicates that about 
30% of subscribers to the scheme worked 
in the informal sector, and 7% worked in the 
formal sector. ‘Vulnerable’ people – including 
pregnant women, children, those aged 70 and 
above, and the homeless – constituted 63.2% 
of those registered (NDPC 2009; NHIA 2010). 
Getting people to subscribe to the scheme 
was not all that easy. According to some 
district health insurance fund managers, 
one of the biggest constraints to the 
success of their enrolment drives was 
the perception that enrolling in the NHIS 
meant siding with the NPP (Alatinga 2011). 
This perception gradually waned after a 
public campaign by the National Health 
Insurance Authority (NHIA) highlighted 
the benefits of the scheme. During the first 
implementation phase, there were complaints 
from the public and board members of 
district health insurance schemes about 
the operations of scheme managers and 
start-up consultants (Agyepong and 
Adjei 2008; NHIA 2008). This led the 
new Minister of Health to suspend all the 
scheme’s services to enable an operational 
audit, which exposed malfeasance in some 
districts. As implementation continued, 
the main challenges that affected the 
smooth operation of the scheme included 
losses incurred from claim settlements 
as a result of fraud, inflation of prices of 
medicines supplied to subscribers, irrational 
prescription of medicines, overbilling, 
provision of services above the accredited 
levels, delays in claim payments, and district 
schemes not being held accountable for their 
operations (Gobah and Zhang 2011; NHIA 
2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012).
Implementation phase II: 
the NDC era (2009–15)
During the campaign for the 2008 elections, 
the opposition NDC included in its platform 
pledges to fix the problems with the NHIS 
and reform the scheme so that it provided 
basic healthcare coverage for all. On winning 
the elections and coming into power, the 
NDC government appointed a new director 
for the NHIA to begin work on resolving 
the challenges of the NHIS and to review 
Act 650. Measures to reform the scheme 
included a financial audit of the NHIA and all 
the district health schemes commissioned 
by the government. There was also the 
disbanding of the local boards of the district 
schemes due to perceived political leanings 
and influence in selecting the members, and 
the practice whereby board members out-
numbered official staff. This was reported 
to burden government coffers heavily (NHIA 
2010; Seddoh, Adjei and Nazzar 2011).
A legislative process was set in place by 
the NHIA that culminated in the review of 
Act 650, which was duly superseded by 
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Act 852 in 2012. This process was led by 
Law and Development Associates (LADA), a 
consulting firm commissioned by the NHIA 
to examine the policy and legislative review 
of the scheme. LADA held a series of high-
level strategic meetings with the Minister of 
Health, the Chief Executive Officer of the NHIA 
and other directors of the NHIS to present 
a progress report on the outcome of the 
legislative review. An interview with the lead 
consultant, Dr Atuguba, showed that these 
meetings focused on the major components of 
the legislative review, namely the new bill and 
legislative instruments, and an operational 
manual. The firm also consulted with service 
providers and health insurance beneficiaries 
in all of Ghana’s ten administrative regions, 
using surveys and focus group discussions to 
learn about challenges of the scheme. 
After developing the proposed legislation, 
the consultants conducted three validation 
meetings across the country to further 
deliberate on the legislative proposals, 
and for actors who had made an input to 
the proposal to validate its content. The 
workshops also sought to elicit participants’ 
views on the most effective and efficient 
ways to operationalise the proposals in the 
form of regulations and manuals to guide 
implementing officers. There were a total of 
236 participants from the National Health 
Insurance Council (NHIC), the NHIA and its 
regional offices, the district mutual health 
insurance schemes and their beneficiaries, the 
MoH, the GHS, the Ghana Medical Association 
(GMA), the Ghana Employers Association, 
academia, various service providers, and CSOs 
operating in the health sector (LADA 2012).
The NDC government was silent about 
funding arrangements during the review of 
Act 650, due to its inability to fulfil one of its 
2008 election promises – to ensure a one-
time premium payment for all. By the 2012 
general elections, it was clear that it was 
not practical to fulfil this promise due to the 
financial challenges that faced the scheme. 
The NHIA has constantly delayed payments to 
service providers – a situation that was hotly 
discussed in the 2012 general election and will 
be again in the 2016 general election. Delays 
in payment have been a cause for concern 
in the implementation and revision phases 
of the scheme. The TUC, the GMA, the GHS, 
the CHAG, the Society of Private Medical and 
Dental Practitioners, the Ghana Registered 
Midwives Association, the Pharmaceutical 
Society of Ghana, the Ghana Catholic Bishops 
Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, 
academics and CSOs in the health sector 
are all beseeching the government to fix the 
payment delay problem, alongside other 
challenges associated with the scheme.
In short, despite the passage of Act 852 and 
the review of the health insurance policy, 
challenges in creating universal access 
The National Health Insurance Authority has constantly 
delayed payments to service providers – a situation that was 
hotly discussed in the 2012 general election and will be again 
in the 2016 general election.
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to public health still linger. Barely a year 
before the 2016 general election, a new 
Minister of Health commissioned a seven-
member technical committee to review the 
implementation of the NHIS and recommend 
ways of improving the scheme (MoH 2015), 
in response to growing pressure among 
the electorate and civil society actors that 
the scheme is collapsing under the NDC 
administration. As Ghanaians approach the 
polls once again, the NHIS will be a hot topic, 
so the government must be seen to be doing 
something to stave off the perceived collapse 
of the scheme. It is interesting to note that 
two members of this new review committee 
were heavily involved during the design phase.
A typology of actors involved 
in the NHIS policy process
Broadly, those involved in the NHIS policy 
processes can be categorised into state and 
non-state actors. Table 1 presents a typology 
of actors to explore the extent to which 
Table 1. Actors involved in the NHIS policy process
Actor Who did they engage with? How did they engage?
Organised labour Members of the Task Force; 
consultants; Health Committee 
of Parliament; NHIA; Ministries of 
Health and Finance; President
Deliberative workshops; public 
hearings; advisory forums; focus 
group discussions
Development 
partners
Ministry of Health; Ghana Health 
Service; NHIA
One-on-one conversations; 
consultative meetings; lobbying
Health service 
providers
Ministries of Health and Finance; 
NHIA
Consultative meetings
Media Ministries of Health and Finance; 
NHIA; Committees of Parliament
Internet and radio discussions; 
articles and opinion pieces in the 
press
NGOs and policy 
experts
Ministries of Health and Finance; 
NHIA; Committees of Parliament; 
President
Advisory forums; consultative 
meetings; internet and radio 
discussions; articles and opinion 
pieces in the press
The electorate Elected officials and state 
bureaucrats
Radio call-ins; text messaging to 
radio programmes; surveys and 
polls; elections; public hearings
State bureaucrats Organised labour; donors; service 
providers; CSOs; citizens; elected 
officials
Deliberative workshops; public 
hearings; advisory forums; 
consultative meetings; house 
meetings
Politicians Organised labour; donors; service 
providers; CSOs; electorate; 
bureaucrats
Public hearings; consultative 
meetings; election campaigns
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citizens engaged with the state during the 
design, implementation and revision phases 
of the NHIS, and how this engagement in the 
policy processes offered them an opportunity 
to make the state more accountable. The 
subsequent narrative focuses on how each 
type of actor was influential at different 
stages of the policy process.
Organised labour 
The category of organised labour comprises 
workers’ unions, including the Civil Servants 
Association, the Ghana National Association 
of Teachers, the Ghana Registered Nurses 
Association, the Judicial Services Workers 
Union and the TUC. During the NHIS design 
phase, the leadership of these groups 
convened a meeting, studied the bill and 
submitted a formal resolution to Parliament 
protesting that the proposed 2.5% of their 
social security pension contributions should 
not be used to finance the scheme. They also 
protested the haste with which the bill was 
to be passed, and requested a deferment 
of passage, further consultations and 
amendments.
In response to these concerns, the debate 
and passage of the bill was deferred, after 
which Parliament went on recess. According 
to the Health Insurance Officer at the 
MoH, the leadership of these groups was 
then invited to a meeting by the President, 
who appealed to them on the need to use 
their pension contributions as a funding 
source for the scheme. At this meeting, the 
agreement reached was that the 2.5% would 
comprise a loan to the scheme, which would 
be refunded to workers when they reached 
pension age. This is why formal sector 
workers became non-contributory members 
of the scheme. In the meantime, the GMA 
and the TUC played instrumental roles in 
making suggestions during the stakeholder 
consultation forums organised by the 
Task Force. 
During the implementation phase, the voice 
of organised labour was one of those calling 
on the government to account for the delay 
in payments to service providers and to 
provide proper accounting of allocations 
to the national health insurance fund. 
Most engagements with the government 
took the form of deliberative workshops, 
public hearings, advisory forums and focus 
group discussions, and the government 
both consulted with and cooperated with 
organised labour to hear their views.
Development partners
Development partners are the external 
partners and donor agencies that support 
Ghana’s development agenda. Briefly 
silent during the initial design phase of 
the NHIS, at the 2001 health summit – an 
annual meeting bringing together all key 
health sector stakeholders – they cautioned 
against migrating too quickly from existing 
community mutual health insurance 
schemes to a national social health 
scheme (Seddoh, Adjei and Nazzar 2011). 
Nonetheless, during the implementation 
phase, the World Bank, the International 
Labour Organization, Danida, USAID, the 
World Health Organization, Unicef, the UK 
Department for International Development 
and the Korea Foundation for International 
Healthcare all provided either financial 
support for the scheme, or technical 
support in the form of implementation 
strategy and advice. The government’s 
engagements with development partners on 
health insurance proposals took the form 
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of one-on-one conversations, consultative 
meetings and lobbying. In Ghana, donor 
funding to health is channelled through a 
sector-wide approach, whereby all donor 
funds within the health sector are pooled 
in support of various health programmes. 
Throughout the different phases of the 
policy, the government has come up with 
proposals for development partners, such 
as NHIA staff training on various processes 
and some reform measures for the scheme, 
and partners have responded to some of 
these with funding through the sector-
wide approach. Beyond this, development 
partners also fund civil society programmes 
within the health sector.
Health service providers
Health service providers comprise 
community-based health centres; district, 
regional and teaching hospitals; private 
hospitals (represented by the CHAG); 
and pharmaceutical firms. During the 
implementation phase, they complained 
vehemently about the delay of payments due 
to them for services rendered to NHIS enrollees. 
They have been instrumental in sustaining 
the scheme, although the private hospitals 
intermittently revert to patient user fees 
until the government pays the arrears owed 
to them. Some public hospitals have also 
sometimes reverted to user fees, and suppliers 
of pharmaceutical materials have halted 
their services until receiving payment from 
the government. All these health providers 
on average operate for at least four months 
before they receive payment. Sometimes, even 
after a long delay, the government will make 
payment for only a month or two.
During the revision phase, health service 
providers also complained strongly about 
the gradual introduction of capitation 
grants, a form of service-provider payments 
provided for in the now-defunct Act 650 
and the new Act 852. Service providers 
normally engage with the government 
through consultative meetings, but despite 
these consultations, the government does 
not usually take their views on board, instead 
forcing proposals on them under the pretext 
of ensuring quality of service for health 
insurance beneficiaries. 
Media
The media has been active at all phases of 
the policy process. Prior to the legislation 
of the NHIS, the media shed light on the ill 
effects of the ‘cash and carry’ system and 
government inaction on a policy within the 
old system that exempted the poor and 
vulnerable from payments for accessing 
healthcare. Since the NHIS legislation was 
passed, the media has been active in calling 
on the government to account for the delay 
in payments to service providers and the 
funding allocations to the national insurance 
fund. The media is always engaging with the 
government through its reportage, radio and 
internet discussions on the challenges that 
confront the NHIS.
NGOs and policy experts
Experts specialised in drafting legislation, 
health policy and budgeting were included 
in the design and revision phases of the 
NHIS policy. As well as offering technical 
inputs, they also drafted the different 
legislations (interview, Nana Amo, 19 July 
2015; interview, Raymond Atuguba, 9 August 
2015). During the implementation and 
revision phases, NGOs in the health sector 
also added their voices to the situation of 
delayed payments, because of the adverse 
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impact on the poor and vulnerable among 
their constituencies. These NGOs have been 
pushing for the NHIS to deliver universal 
healthcare coverage, maintaining that it 
could be achieved if the main challenges 
of the scheme are attended to. They are 
also pushing for strategies that the NHIA 
could adopt to facilitate the enrolment of 
the poor and vulnerable. Policy experts and 
NGOs have engaged with the government 
through advisory forums and consultative 
meetings. The government has in most 
cases collaborated with these actors on 
recommendations to improve the NHIS, but 
refused to listen to critical research findings 
that they have presented.
The electorate 
Health insurance in Ghana is mainly 
about the welfare of the people. High 
unemployment, low income levels and 
poverty mean that the masses see national 
health insurance as a priceless social 
protection option for the majority of people. 
Since the 1996 general election, health 
insurance has become one of the core social 
issues that influence people to vote for a 
particular political party. For instance, the 
NPP’s zeal to win the 2004 general election 
nudged them into passing Act 650 into law. 
Similarly, the NDC’s zeal to win the 2012 
general election led to the revision of the old 
law into Act 852. 
However, the citizenry continues to lament 
the impact of delayed payment to service 
providers. Some citizens have engaged with 
the government on the NHIS by expressing 
their frustrations through radio call-ins, text 
messaging to radio programmes, surveys 
and public hearings. But on the whole, 
elections have been the main accountability 
mechanism for the electorate on the health 
insurance scheme.
State bureaucrats
State bureaucrats comprise senior members 
of the civil service and public servants at 
the MoH, the Ministry of Finance, the GHS 
and the NHIA. According to a member of 
the Task Force, Irene Agyepong, the early 
planning of the NHIS was led by technocrats 
from the MoH. State bureaucrats wanted 
reforms in the health sector, and they utilised 
the window of opportunity created by the 
NPP during their 2000 election campaign 
to advocate for them. During the revision of 
the NHIS, they also utilised the opportunity 
to advocate for a wider range of types of 
sickness to be included in the scheme’s 
benefit package. State bureaucrats, on behalf 
of the government, engaged with organised 
labour, development partners and civil society 
actors in deliberative workshops, public 
hearings, advisory forums, consultative 
meetings and in-house meetings. In such 
instances these bureaucrats consulted and 
cooperated with diverse stakeholders on 
government proposals.
Politicians
Politicians comprise the elected and 
appointed political officers of the state. The 
two Ministers of Health appointed during the 
design phase were instrumental in providing 
support for the first Planning Task Force, 
and the two subsequent planning teams. 
According Kofi Aduesi, Health Insurance 
Officer at the MoH, the Minister of Health 
from 2002 until 2004, Dr Kweku Afriyie, 
held several weekly meetings with the Task 
Force and planning teams to listen to all 
sides of the debates on structure and funding 
arrangements. His leadership in this regard 
created opportunity for bureaucrats and 
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consultants to make inputs into the draft 
policy. Most importantly, the President was 
able to persuade a large section of organised 
labour to accept the proposal of using 2.5% 
of their pension deductions as a funding 
source for the scheme. Strong NPP control 
of the Presidency and Parliament in this 
phase limited the ability of the NDC, then 
in opposition, to stop the NHIA legislation, 
which was passed in August 2003. Most 
engagements on health insurance by 
politicians took the form of public hearings, 
consultative meetings and election 
campaigns. In most instances, politicians 
cooperated with key stakeholders on health 
insurance at different phases of the policy. 
Implications for policy 
and practice 
As countries go through democratic 
consolidation, having a vibrant political 
society – including an independent media, 
vocal CSOs and strong political opposition 
– can make governments more responsive 
to citizens’ demands. When democratic 
governments have urgent goals without 
necessarily having a clear road map on 
how to reach them, they are more open to 
listen – to concert and consult – with non-
state actors. This briefing uses the case of 
Ghana’s NHIS to track state responsiveness 
to citizen demands for access to public 
services and examines the extent to which 
urgency contributed to an increase in 
political accountability. The policy process 
offered political accountability to citizens 
because state and non-state actors shared 
the same urgency and common goal, despite 
not agreeing on the course of action to reach 
it. As the policy process progressed and the 
sense of urgency subsided, the state felt less 
of a need to concert with non-state actors, 
but still consulted them.
This case provides insights into the 
opportunities presented by the creation 
and implementation of Ghana’s NHIS to 
hold the state accountable, through social 
and political mechanisms, for citizens’ 
rights to basic health services. As the 
process continues to unfold, elections, 
media exposure and deliberative meetings 
through sector working groups will 
continue to be effective tools for holding 
the state accountable on the health front. 
In the medium term, the passage of a 
freedom of information bill would deepen 
transparency of the state which, donors 
hope, would complement the push for social 
accountability.
As countries go through democratic consolidation, having a 
vibrant political society – including an independent media, 
vocal CSOs and strong political opposition – can make 
governments more responsive to citizens’ demands.
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